Trouble for Venezuela: Polarization and Disappointment post-Chavez

Prior to Chávez’s actual death, I already had thoughts about what a post-Chavez Venezuela would look like. I used to think that Venezuela after Chavez would undergo extreme political fractionalization. Chávez had handpicked a successor, Nicolás Maduro, but tension still existed within his party as other potential leaders felt cast aside. The opposition had only unified for the first time against Chávez in the 2012 election and without a common figure to oppose, it would be unlikely for the opposition to remain unified.

Chavez’s death did not result in this degree of fragmentation, however. The chavista Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela party remained unified, as did the opposition, going into the election on April 14. However, although Venezuela has not become fractionalized, it has become extremely polarized. Maduro barely won Sunday’s election with 50.7 percent of the vote, versus Capriles’s 49.1 percent, a difference that in itself would be enough to cause commotion. What is perhaps even more frustrating is that distrust in the government and the National Electoral Council is well founded enough that there is no way to be sure that the announced election results are legitimate.

Maduro’s election strategy was to present himself almost as a reincarnation of Chávez, even wearing the same track suit with the Venezuelan flag that Chávez was known for and blasting a recording of Chavez’s voice singing the national anthem at rallies. The fact of the matter is that Venezuela has not elected Chávez; the presidency has been handed over to a leader who is far less charismatic and politically competent. Roughly half of Venezuela, according to election results at least, already opposes Maduro; the other half will soon face the harsh reality that Maduro is not Chávez, no matter how hard he tries. Venezuelans on both sides seem to be headed towards political disappointment, and with a recent history of disrespect for democratic institutions in the country, the response to this disappointment with the government could be drastic.

Delany Sisiruca ’16 lives in Lionel Hall.

Venezuela’s Regional Agenda Will Take the Backseat

As we watch the post-electoral chaos unfold in Venezuela, many of us Latin Americans ponder a common question: What will the new, post-Chávez Venezuela mean for the rest of the region?

Armed with petrodollars, blazing rhetoric, and a persuasive ideology, Chávez spent much of his time in office attempting to spread his ideals and policy objectives across the region. This directly contributed to many of the past decade’s great transformations in Latin American relations: the creation of the Union of South American Nations and the Bolivarian Alliance, the rise of a “pink tide” of like-minded populist and leftist presidents in countries like Bolivia and Argentina, the gradual exclusion of the United States and Canada from regional affairs, and the vilification of Colombia and other right-wing governments in the region. Troubled right-wing parties, along with U.S. administrations that were either too unpopular (Bush’s) or too passive (Obama’s), helped clear the path for these changes.

Assuming that Nicolás Maduro will survive the current political crisis relatively unscathed, he is unlikely to give this regional agenda much attention anytime soon. Some of the logic behind this is intuitive: He will be busy reconstructing his legitimacy among Venezuelans and building foreign policy consensus among chavista leaders. But he will also be forced to confront a deeply troubled economy, putting at risk resources previously spent in the electoral campaigns and hydrocarbon needs of neighboring nations. Moreover, regional alignment around policies favored by the late Chávez may begin to fade as left-wing governments in the region face a series of significant electoral challenges in the months and years ahead.

This presents an important opportunity for the region: It is a chance to give broader legitimacy to promising institutions like UNASUR by maintaining worthwhile elements of Chávez’s agenda (greater regional cooperation, for instance) while ridding them of the more destructive aspects of his political legacy (such as his fuzzy relationship with democratic values). The question, of course, is whether Latin America’s leaders will rise up to the occasion.

Manuel Melendez ’15 is a government concentrator in Cabot House. He is the President of Harvard Association Cultivating Inter-American Democracy.

The Bumpy Road Ahead

A post-Chavez Venezuela has a tough road ahead. Nicolas Maduro, Hugo Chavez’s Vice President and chosen successor, was just elected president on Sunday; though not unexpected, his victory was very narrow. Maduro won by about 234,000 votes, or 1.5 percent as of now. Compared to Chavez’s 9 percent margin of victory in the recent October 2012 elections, Maduro’s surprisingly narrow victory signals growing discontent among Venezuelans with extremely high levels of crime, state corruption and inefficiency, and food shortages. The opposition’s calls for a recount and refusal to accept Maduro as president similarly demonstrate the precarious situation in Venezuela.