In Asia, he explains that we cannot let the North Koreans use America to pressure the South Koreans, that we must affirm our ties to Japan and that we should carefully continue to explore the possibility of cooperation with China (while being sure not to push them too hard on Taiwan, human rights, or the other issues generated by American public sentiment).

In the Middle East, he again says patience is the key. He implicitly blames Clinton’s quest for a legacy for the collapse of the peace process, and demands that the U.S. walk a tightrope, being sure not to play a role in pushing too hard for agreements, but at the same time retaining its trusteeship of the region.

In Africa, Kissinger begins by admitting that the U.S. has no geopolitical interest on the continent. He leaves the continent to the world community, explaining, “[Africa] should be turned into a test of the ability of the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, other international institutions, and the private sector to cooperate in the pursuit of universal goals.”

But Kissinger’s generosity in turning over the keys to the continent only highlights his failure to deal with the occasion when morality, economics, and geopolitics all conflict to different degrees.

The necessary balancing is explained in neither of the subsequent chapters on economics and human rights. The chapter on globalization says little other than that globalization might influence the way nation-states act in the international system, that it’s another factor that can cause states to deviate from the pool-ball like predictable physics of national self-interest.

Kissinger begins his chapter on Peace and Justice with the following phrase: “Probably the most dramatic transformation in the nature of contemporary international affairs has been the general acceptance of the proposition that certain universal principles are deemed enforceable.”

The phrase sums up his approach to these issues. Kissinger steadfastly refuses to enter into the question of whether these principles are important enough to ever outrank geopolitics, instead presenting them as esoteric details imposed on statesmen by an ignorant public. He never enters into the question of where national interest comes from and dodges the argument that it is these domestic preferences that gives statesmen and geopolitics its direction.

The result is that Kissinger focuses entirely on the question of enforcement and jurisdiction. He argues that international tribunals should be closely overseen and deems jurists’ attempts to extend their jurisdiction across borders a threat to national sovereignty, global civil society or not.