Their squeamishness, some analysts think, stems from an old argument among army officers that many observers thought Lin had settled years ago. In the late 1950's, many professional officers, including the Defense Minister at that time, P'eng Tehhuai, complained that the PLA was asked to spend too much time bringing in harvests and building dams. The officers wanted to build a crack modern army and felt too little time was left for military training. China, they thought, should swallow its pride and a little ideology and accept Russian help in building modern weapons stockpiles, including atomic bombs.
P'eng and the Experts
Beneath these demands lay a clash between two different personality styles. P'eng, to some extent, represented the "experts," those who thought the most valuable men to China were the trained and ingenious technicians. Mao Tse-tung, who loathed the "expert" ideal, dismissed P'eng and replaced him with Lin. Mao's ideal man was the "red," a man of lower class background who believed, like Mao, that will power and unquestioned loyalty to socialism and to China would together win the world.
Lin solved the conflict through compromise. True to Mao, he intensified the ideological education of soldiers, but at the same time accelerated work on the atomic bomb and began to devote more time to military training.
The current Cultural Revolution is in a grander sense another clash of "reds" and "experts" that may tear apart the old compromise. The reds are Mao's Red Guards plus groups of older citizens that support them; the experts are the bureaucrats and local party leaders who have devoted their lives to fulfilling production quotas and maintaining their power.
Who Loses What?
Army officers who supported P'eng in 1959 probably realize that their interests lie with the anti-Mao, expert faction. But they face a dilemma. They don't want to risk another defeat, especially in this case, when no one knows (or likes to think about) the fate of the losers. Yet, they are not eager to give substantial help to the reds.
They are not encouraged by scatered reports that PLA units in some areas have alreadly actively committed themselves to the Maoists, while in other areas they are siding with the opposition. Such an uncertain situation forces army officers, as it does many others in China, to be wary of precipitate action. They may hope that by delaying they will gain time to pick out the eventual winner.
With one hand on the handle, the PLA axe is very useful, and they know it. With two hands fighting for it, life becomes hazardous for the men of the PLA. When the axe finally has to fall, they want to be sure that it doesn't chop off their own heads