(Three weeks ago, James C. Thomson, Assistant Professor of History and a member of the East Asian Research Center, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam and China. Following are his introductory statement and his testimony before the Committee.)

We are moving into a fourth year of systematic bombing of China's neighbor and ally, North Vietnam. Clearly no discussion of our response to revolution in Asia, Mr. Chairman, can avoid that matter of most urgent concern to us all, the war in Vietnam.

I myself have long been persuaded that our Vietnam involvement was unwise. It is, moreover, a profoundly depressing case study of our mishandling of an Asian revolutionary problem.

We moved in as a result of our shock at the Communist victory in China and the French defeat in Vietnam--a defeat, as I have noted, by a Communist Party that had achieved leadership of a nationalist movement. And at each juncture that we felt ourselves losing our grip, we increased our investment. Opportunities to exit with a modicum of grace were regularly by-passed in the expectation of eventual success. And now that that success seems further off than ever, our stakes have been transformed, and exit is infinitely harder.

Today there are some American planners, in the universities as well as Washington, who still see Vietnam as the ultimate test of their doctrine. I have in mind those gifted but in my view, wrongheaded men who have given a new life to the missionary thrust in American foreign relations--who believe that this nation, in this era, has been granted a threefold endowment of sorts that can transform the world.

That endowment is, they believe, composed of, first, our unsurpased miltary might; second, our clear technological supremacy; and third, our allegedly invincible benevolence (our altruism, our affluence, our lack of territorical aspirations).

Together, it is argued, this three-fold endowment provides us with the opportunity and the obligation to ease the nations of the earth toward modernization and stability, towards what might be called a full-fledged "Pax American Technocratica."

In reaching toward this goal, Vietnam is seen as the last and crucial test, a test not only of doctrine but a test of our character. Once we have succeeded there, they seem to feel, the road ahead is clear.

They are our counterpart to the visionaries of communism's radical left; they are, in a sense, technocracy's own Maoists.

I do not suggest that this governs Washington today, but I do suggest that this doctrine rides high and poses a danger. It is a doctrine that would perpetuate our East Asian overinvestment in response to the Chinese revolution. And it is a doctrine that must be rejected.

The highest of character is clearly to learn from the past, to admit one's mistakes, and to act on that admission. The record of our East Asian involvement is long and complex; we have done unwise things, we have done hard things, we have done good things--and there is much more good we can do.

The Testimony

THE CHAIRMAN: I would also say that from your own remarks you think our policy is disastrous for the country?

MR. THOMSON: That is correct, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Senator Morse, I believe I will let you ask the next question. That answered my questions.