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Arms and Algeria

The United States has finally made its decision in North Africa. The value of making a choice should have been apparent to the State Department months ago. The two comparatively clear-cut alternatives, support for French colonialism or Algerian independence, are not irreconcilable, but are of a sufficiently inflammatory nature to require United States recognition.

The final decision to disregard possible offense to France and to ship arms to Tunisia was, in the circumstances, the best one. By giving a measure of approval to North African independence and by gaining British support for the move, the United States has effectively disassociated itself from the colonialist camp. If in doing so, America has temporarily alienated France, the breach is only temporary and was, moreover, inevitable.

Hopefully, one by-product of the shipment of weapons will be a revitalizaed French approach to the Algerian problems. Already Gaillard and Pineau have taken a significant step forward in introducing a bill for limited Algerian autonomy into the Chamber of Deputies. Only the French could be so perverse as to defeat such a bill twice in a row. The best hope for peace in North Africa is a program of gradual independence under the sponsorship and with the guidance of France. The French legislators, irrational or not, cannot ignore the need and the solution forever.

The United States, however, will have to do more for a concrete settlement of the Algerian crisis than simply hand out arms and sympathy to the parties concerned. Aside from attempting to reconcile the French to the change, American diplomacy will have to aim for a strong and, eventually, a fully autonomous Algeria.

Obviously, France is not yet ready to grant the total independence it must eventually give. Because of this initial unwillingness, there is a good chance that any legislation for independence will de designed to keep Algeria so weak that it cannot, with justification, ask for full freedom. The United States must show France that a weak Algeria is worse than no Algeria at all. The only hope for good relations between France and its North African colony is mutual trust and understanding. These can be gained, however, only if France now demonstrates its willingness to award eventual autonomy and also to guide and strengthen Algeria through the intermediate stage.

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