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Cabbages and Kings

When Joseph Stalin "replied" to a newspaperman's questionnaire late last month, he plunged the Western world into a whirlpool of violent controversy. Was Stalin's offer to meet President Truman behind the "iron curtain" made in good faith?--or was it only another sly twist in the Soviet propaganda campaign to split the Western defenses? The United States government has heavily inclined to the latter view and has consequently been excoriated or misunderstood by many people who sincerely believe that Stalin meant just exactly what he said.

The refusal of Truman and Secretary Acheson to leap eagerly after the Stalin lead is not a sign that the United States doesn't want to talk things over with the Russians. Regular diplomatic channels have always been wide open for Soviet-American discussions. Time and again, our government has made overtures through these channels to the Russians for conferences. And each time, the Russians have either refused or remained silent. In one case (the Bedell Smith episode), they seized on one of these diplomatic feelers and splattered it all over the front pages, instead of proceeding calmly to show us they wanted a quiet and orderly meeting.

The facts show that this country wants to talk over world problems with the Soviet Union, both within and outside of the United Nations. The facts also show that the Soviet Union does not now desire such conferences. The Russians know how to do diplomatic business; they know that the way to got things done is not through the agency of the world press. In 1939, when Russia wanted to make a deal with Nazi Germany, the Soviet propaganda machine switched from an anti-Nazi Germany, the soviet propaganda machine switched from an anti-Nazi campaign to a conciliatory position, and the subsequent negotiations were all highly secret and ultra-diplomatic. The Russians are adept at international poker. They don't negotiate through the newspapers.

The Stalin statement was, therefore, far from a grandiose gesture in the direction of solving the cold war. It was a very clever frame-up, and in spite of Secretary Acheson's reasoned reply, it made the United States look like a villain to many people. It was neatly timed to interfere with the Atlantic Alliance negotiations between Western powers. Why combine against the Soviet threat when there may be no threat at all?--this was an immediate reaction to Stalin's vague and friendly words, and it showed how devastating Russian propaganda can be.

In the future, the Soviets may make legitimate movements toward the settlement of international disputes. They may work honestly to effect a Truman-Stalin meeting without ballyhoo and propagandizing motives. This would be an excellent beginning to East-West agreements, and it must be earnestly followed up by Washington. But even this could not solve the world's troubles. There can be no side-sweeping Truman-Stalin "deals." Only a concert of Western powers can bargain with Russia. If Truman and Stalin tried to compromise their way to a more comfortable "peace," the patient work of the North Atlantic group of powers would be disrupted.

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This does not, of course, mean that Russian-American meetings would be worthless, or that important agreements could not come out of them. But such meetings cannot take place until the Russians quit stalling and playing politics with the world's desperate desire for an international settlement. All the evidence concerning the recent Stalin affair shows that the Russians are not ready for serious conferences at this time. Stalin's statement was purely for publicity purposes, and it's surprising that so many Americans fall for it.

(Articles in this department represent the opinions of those editors who differ with the expressed editorial policy of the CRIMSON.)

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